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THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS AND THE UCC: A REAL
PROPERTY LAW PERSPECTIVE
ROBERT KRATOVIL*
INTRODUCTION

In the last two decades some rather revolutionary changes
have taken place in the area of real property law. New doctrines
have been announced and have proceeded to sweep the country.
The alacrity with which the new doctrines have been embraced
occasions surprise. Rapid change has not been a conspicuous
characteristic of real property law. But more importantly,
courts have brought an approach to these deviations from stare
decisis that portends even greater change. It seems appropriate
to examine these decisions and other areas of real property law
that seem ripe for change, and to analyze the process of change.
WARRANTIES IN SALES OF NEW HOMES-BASIS FOR RULE THAT
STATUTES ARE A PREMISE FOR JUDICIAL REASONING

In the sale by a merchant-builder of a new home there is,
under the new decisions, an implied warranty of habitability
and sound construction. The old, firmly-entrenched doctrine of
caveat emptor has disappeared in this area. Credit has been
given the Colorado Supreme Court for introducing this innovation.' Courts everywhere have hastened to indicate their ac*

J.D., DePaul University; Professor, The John Marshall Law School.

1. Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).

2. Cochran v. Keeton, 252 So. 2d 313 (Ala. 1971); Columbia Western
Corp. v. Vela, 122 Ariz. 28, 592 P.2d 1294 (Ct. App. 1979); Wawak v. Stewart,
247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970); Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal.
3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo.
78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964); Gilsan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260
(1963); Vernali v. Centrella, 28 Conn. Supp. 476, 266 A.2d 200 (1970); Berman
v. Watergate West, Inc., 391 A.2d 1351 (D.C. App. 1978); Gable v. Silver, 258

So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. dismissed, 264 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1972);
Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 76 Ill. 2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154 (1979); Weck v. A:M Sunrise
Constr. Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1962); Barnes v. Mac Brown &
Co., 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976); Theis v. Heuer, 264 Ind. 1, 280 N.E.2d
300 (1972); Markman v. Hoefer, 252 Iowa 118, 106 N.W.2d 59 (1960); McFeeters v. Renollet, 210 Kan. 158, 500 P.2d 47 (1972); Crawley v. Terhune, 437
S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1969); Roberts v. Boulmay, 186 So. 2d 188 (La. App. 1966)
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ceptance of the new
view. 2 The legal literature is favorable to
3
the new decisions.
It is significant that most of the courts, in arriving at the new
rule, found persuasive the analogy afforded by the implied warranty sections of the UCC. 4 It is evident from these decisions
that a clear majority of the courts were willing to draw upon
public policy considerations reflected in a statute that has no explicit application to real property. The inferences are obvious
and of overwhelming importance. Thus, we have at last a widespread acceptance of the view first propounded by Chief Justice
Stone when he argued that we should treat a statute like a judi(based on redhibitory action, LA. CIv. CODE. ANN. arts. 2520-2548 (West
1952)); Krol v. York Terrace Bldg., Inc., 35 Md. App. 321, 370 A.2d 589 (1977)
(discussing MD. REAL PROP. ANN. CODE. art. 21, § 10-203 (1981)); Weeks v.
Slavick Builders, Inc., 24 Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503, affid, 384 Mich. 257,
181 N.W.2d 271 (1970); Robertson Lumber Co. v. Stephen Farmers Coop. Elevator Co., 274 Minn. 17, 143 N.W.2d 622 (1966); Brown v. Elton Chalk, Inc.,
358 So. 2d 721 (Miss. 1978); Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795
(Mo. 1972); Henggeler v. Jindra, 191 Neb. 317, 214 N.W.2d 925 (1974); Norton
v. Burleaud, 115 N.H. 435, 342 A.2d 629 (1975); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,
44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); McDonald v. Mianecki, 159 N.J. Super. 1, 386
A.2d 1325 (App. Div. 1978), aff'd, 79 N.J. 275, 398 A.2d 1283 (1979); Lutz v.
Bayberry Huntington, Inc., 148 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Hinson v. Jefferson, 287 N.C. 422, 215 S.E.2d 102 (1975); Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 209
S.E.2d 776 (1974); Air Heaters, Inc. v. Johnson Elec., Inc., 258 N.W.2d 649
(N.D. 1977); Dobler v. Malloy, 214 N.W.2d 510 (N.D. 1973); Tibbs v. National
Homes Constr. Corp., 52 Ohio App. 2d 281, 369 N.E.2d 1218 (1977); Jeanguneat v. Jackie Hames Constr. Co., 576 P.2d 761 (Okla. 1978); Jones v.
Gatewood, 381 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1963); Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or. 635, 525 P.2d
1019 (1974); Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972); Padula v. J.J.
Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., 111 R.I. 29, 298 A.2d 529 (1973); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff,
254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83
S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
The following decisions have held so indirectly: Tibbitts v. Openshaw, 18
Utah 2d 442, 425 P.2d 160 (1967); Rothberg v. Olenik, 128 Vt. 295, 262 A.2d 461
(1970); House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428,457 P.2d 199 (1969); Hoye v. Century Builders, 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958); Tavares v. Horstman, 542
P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975).
3. See Haskell, The Casefor an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of
Real Property, 53 GEO. L.J. 633 (1965); Jaeger, The Warranty of Habitability,
47 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1 (1970); Nielsen, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Real Property-Time for a Reappraisal, 10 ARiz. L. REv. 484 (1968); Valore, Products
Liability For a Defective House, 18 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 319 (1969); Recent
Decisions, Contracts-CaveatEmptor-Implied Warranty of Habitability,
12 DUQ. L. REV. 109 (1973); Note, An Implied Warranty of Fitness and Suitability for Human Habitation as Applied to the Sales Of.New Homes in
Texas, 6 Hous. L. REV. 176 (1968); Note, Builder-Vendor Liabilityfor Construction Defects in Houses, 55 MARQ. L: REV. 369 (1972); Notes and Comments, Torts-Implied Warranty in Real Estate-Privity Requirement, 44
N.C.L. REV. 236 (1965); Note, Implied Warranties in the Sale of Real Estate,
26 U. MIAMI L. REV. 838 (1972); Recent Decisions, Vendor & Purchaser-Abrogation of Caveat Emptor in New Homes Sales by Builder-Vendor, 7 U.
RicH. L. REV. 399 (1972).
4. See, e.g., Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922, 923 (1970);
Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 76 Ill. 2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154 (1979).
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cial precedent: as both a declaration and a source of law, and as
5
a premise for legal reasoning.
This view has been accepted in the Restatement (Second)
of Property. 6 Acceptance of the UCC as a premise for judicial
reasoning may be found in the case law as early as 1951. 7 Other
more recent decisions exist. 8 But the principle is by no means
confined to the UCC; scattered throughout the bound volumes of
the Restatement (Second) of Property are numerous citations
to statutes dealing with landlord and tenant law. These form the
basis for a number of the black letter rules found in the Restatement. We may then attempt to formulate the principle in our
own black-letter rule form, as follows:
Where it is evident that a body of statutory law is expressive of a
public policy formulated in light of a current economic and social
background, the policy expressed in those statutes offers a reliable
guide in the decision of real property law matters. The statute need
not relate to real property.
WARRANTIES IN RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT LAwDEMISE OF CAVEAT EMPTOR IN CONSUMER

TRANSACTIONS

The decisional law moved quickly and naturally from sales
of homes by merchant-builders to the area of residential landlord and tenant law. Here, too, the courts found an implied war5. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. REV. 4, 13
(1936). Justice Stone observed that in civil law countries,
[statutory] precepts are statements of general principles, to be used as
guides to decision. Under that system a new statute may be viewed as
an exemplification of a general principle which is to take its place beside other precepts, whether found in codes or accepted expositions of
the jurists, as an integral part of the system, there to be extended to
analogous situations not within its precise terms.
Id. See generally R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAw 232-34 (3d ed. 1970).
6. In the Introduction to the Restatement (Second), Herbert Wechsler,
Director of the American Law Institute, noted:
[I] n assessing the continuing vitality of precedents, rules and doctrines
of the past, [courts] may give weight to the policies reflected in more
recent, widespread legislation, though the statutes by their terms do
not apply-treating the total body of statutory law in the manner endorsed long ago by Mr. Justice Stone "as both a declaration and a
source of law, and as a premise for legal reasoning."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, LANDLORD AND TENANT at vii (1977)

(citation omitted).
7. See Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Consolidated Fisheries Co., 190 F.2d
817, 822 n.9 (3d Cir. 1951).
8. See, e.g., Zamore v. Whitten, 395 A.2d 435, 442 (Me. 1978) (UCC may
be applied by analogy to situations not covered by the Code); Pugh v.
Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897, 904 (1979) (in assessing newly enacted
laws, courts may seek guidance from policies underlying related
legislation).
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ranty of habitability. 9 The case law has prompted a substantial
body of periodical literature. 10
Any number of inferences can be drawn from this vast body
of law. However, to narrow the area of concentration, one can
confidently extract a useful principle for deciding real property
issues today. Combining the thoughts expressed in the buildersales cases with the landlord and tenant cases, and treating both
as consumer transactions, we have another principle:
In real property transactions involving consumers, the old rules of
caveat emptor have ceased to exist.
UNCONSCIONABILITY AND THE UCC-THE UCC AS A PREMISE
FOR JUDIcIL REASONING

The view that courts must concern themselves with questions of unconscionability is, of course, no novelty. The law of
real property mortgages, notably that portion dealing with the
equitable right of redemption, is one long treatise on the subject
of unconscionability going back to 1600. But to find the concept
9. Knight v. Hallsthamer, 160 Cal. Rptr. 847, 852 (1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 29 Cal. 3d 46, 623 P.2d 268, 171 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1981); Thomas v.
Roper, 162 Conn. 343, 350, 294 A.2d 321, 325 (1972); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little,
50 IUI. 2d 351, 366, 280 N.E.2d 208, 217 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796
(Iowa 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 333, 521 P.2d 304, 309 (1974);
Crowell v. McCaffrey, 377 Mass. 443, 386 N.E.2d 1256, 1261 (1979); King v.
Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 69 (Mo. App. 1973); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 93,
276 A.2d 248, 251-52 (1971); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 470, 308 A.2d 17, 21
(1979); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 144, 265 A.2d 526, 533 (1970); Glyco v.
Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 30, 289 N.E.2d 919, 925 (Ohio Cir. Ct. 1972); Pugh v.
Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 284, 405 A.2d 897, 900-03 (1979). Pugh v. Holmes cites
Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin as having adopted the rule of implied warranty in the rental
of residential property, in some instances by statute and in other instances
by court decision. 405 A.2d at 901 n.2.
10. See Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat
Lessee, Negligence or Strict Liability?, 75 Wis. L. REV. 19 (1975); Moskovitz,
The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A New Doctrine Raising New Issues,
62 CALIF. L. REV. 1444 (1974); Recent Cases, Landlord and Tenant-Tenantable Condition of Premises-Relationof Landlord's Statutory Obligationsto
Common Law Warranty of Habitability, 25 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 371
(1975); Note, JudicialExpansion of Tenant's Private Law Rights: Implied
Warrantiesof Habitabilityin Residential UrbanLeases, 56 CORNELL L. REV.
489 (1970); Note, Landlord and Tenant: Contractual Basisfor an Implied
Warranty of Habitability and Safety in Leased Premises, 77 DicK L. REV.
185 (1972); Comment, Tenant Protectionin Iowa-Mease v. Fox and the Implied Warranty of Habitability,58 IowA L. REV. 656 (1972); Comment, Landlord and Tenant Law--Implied Warranty of Habitability-ExternalDefect
of Suburban Townhouse Entitles Tenant to a Rent Abatement, 7 Rurr.-CAm.
L. REV. 617 (1975).
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of unconscionability embodied in a universally accepted statute
(the UCC) gives the view credibility heretofore lacking." The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts adopts the UCC unconscionability concept. 12 Numerous decisions in the area of property
13
law have likewise accepted and applied the concept.
11. The unconscionability provision of the UCC is found in § 2-302; it is
provided therein:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause

of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit
the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or
any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded
a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
U.C.C. § 2-302 (1980).
By far the most exhaustive study of the history of the drafting of the
unconscionability section of the UCC is Leff, Unconscionability and the
Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967). The late
Professor Leff was bitterly opposed to inclusion of the section and argued it
would create insoluble problems. His thesis, unfortunately, was totally demolished in a superb analysis by Professor Murray. Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 34-39 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Unconscionability]. Mankind, in its eternal quest for certitude,
longs for detailed rules that will guide us to a correct solution regardless of
the complexity of the problem. The quest has always been futile, fruitless,
and infantile. Uncertainty is the very essence of human life. This is why
Professor Murray is on solid ground when he tells us that the doctrine of
unconscionability must not be rejected because of the uncertainty it creates. He quotes Cardozo:
As the years have gone by, and as I have reflected more and more
upon the nature of the judicial process, I have become reconciled to the
uncertainty, because I have grown to see it as inevitable. I have grown
to see that the process in its highest reaches is not discovery, but creation; and that the doubts and misgivings, the hopes and fears, are part
of the mind, the pangs of death and the pangs of birth, in which principles that have served their day expire, and new principles are born.
Id. at 11 n.35 (quoting B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
166-67 (paperbound ed., 1961)).
Murray argues for emphasis on the "circle of assent" as the key to the
unconscionability problem. This is a concept he attributes to Karl Llewellyn, who argued that in contract situations what the parties really assent to
is "the few dickered terms." Unconscionability,supra, at 12. In applying
this concept, judges can be counted upon to avoid overkill by judicial selfrestraint. Id. at 24.
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981); see also note 14
and accompanying text.
13. The doctrine of unconscionability has been applied to leases of real
estate. United States v. Bedford Assoc., 491 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Paradee Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 320 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1974), a'd,
343 A.2d 610 (Del. 1975); Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d
144 (1971), noted in 6 IND. L. REV. 108 (1972); Casey v. Lupkes, 286 N.W.2d
204 (Iowa 1979); Mury v. Tublitz, 151 N.J. Super. 39, 376 A.2d 547 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1977); Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120 N.J. Super. 357, 294 A.2d

253 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972); Atlantic Discount Corp. v. Mangel's of
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The unconscionability clause of the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts is found in section 208.14 The Reporter's Note
states that the section is new and follows section 2-302 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. The comments are somewhat
guarded, and the decisional law seems to have moved beyond
them. Nevertheless, the comments recognize unconscionability
in various aspects of contract law: i.e., that the entire contract
may be unconscionable; that a term thereof may be unconscionable, thus denying effect to the unconscionable term; that unconscionability may be found in the negotiating process; that
unconscionability may affect performance and remedies; and
that in certain circumstances it may be unconscionable to invoke an otherwise conscionable clause.' 5 Moreover, the con16
tract may be one relating to land.
It seems appropriate to formulate a statement of a principle
of real property law dealing specifically with the UCC. This
statement draws upon the analogy suggested in Fairbanks,
N.C., Inc., 163 S.E.2d 295 (N.C. 1968); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 480
Pa. 366, 390 A.2d 736 (1978); Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81 Misc. 2d 227, 365
N.Y.S.2d 681 (Sup. Ct. 1975). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 1.6, comment g, § 5.6, comment e (1977), Berger, Hard Leases Make Bad Law, 74 COLUM L. REV. 791, 806 (1974); Hicks,
The Contractual Nature of Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 443, 498
(1972).
The concept of unconscionability has also been applied to mortgages.
United States v. White, 429 F. Supp. 1245 (D.C. Miss. 1977); Delgado v.

Strong, 360 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1978); Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Taylor, 318 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1975); Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. App.
1970); Campbell v. Werner, 232 So. 2d 252 (Fla. App. 1970); Continental Ill.
Nat'l Bank &Trust Co. v. Eastern Ill. Water Co., 31 Ill. App. 3d 148, 334 N.E.2d
96 (1975); Streets v. MGIC Mortgage Corp., 177 Ind. App. 184, 378 N.E.2d 915
(1978) (citing 55 AM. Jim. 2D, Mortgages § 375 (1971)); First Fed. Say. &Loan
Assoc. v. Wick, 322 N.W.2d 860 (S.D. 1982); Miller v. Pacific First Fed. Say. &
Loan Assoc., 86 Wash. 2d 401, 545 P.2d 546 (1976). See also Comment, Applying the Brakes to Acceleration Clauses: Controlling Their Misuse in Real
Property Secured Transactions, 9 CAL. W.L. REV. 514 (1973); Comment, Acceleration Clauses as a ProtectionFor Mortgagesin a Tight Money Market,
20 S.D.L. REV. 329 (1975).
Interest rates that were not usurious have been held to be unconscionable. In re Chicago Reed & Furniture Co., 7 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1925); In re
Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Feller v. Architects
Display Bldg., 54 N.J. Super. 205, 148 A.2d 634 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1959). The law of unconscionability has also been applied to options. Rego
v. Decker, 482 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1971).

14. Section 208 provides:
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract
is made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so

limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
15. See also id. at § 205, comments c, d, and e.
16. See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.10, at 33-34 (1982).
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Morse & Co. v. Consolidated Fisheries Co. :'7
The Uniform Commercial Code, insofar as it expresses principles
of general application, must be treated like the Restatements, since
it bears the stamp of approval of the great body of American
scholarship.

The logic of this limited statement is self-evident. Approval of
this general proposition is present in the periodicals, 18 and it is
accepted in the decisional law. 19
We can further make a more specific application of the concept of unconscionability:
The law of unconscionability as expressed in the UCC and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts is applicable to contracts dealing
with interests in land, whether in the form of leases, options, mortgages, contracts
for the sale of land, or other contractual
20
instruments.

However, the unconscionability section of the UCC deals basically with only one aspect of real property documents, an aspect
that enables courts to deny enforcement of2 1or to delete unconscionable provisions from such documents.
There is an equally important doctrine enabling courts to
insert into such documents provisions needed to make them
worthy of enforcement. In real property law it is a venerable
doctrine, existing long prior to the UCC. Under this doctrine
courts have frequently "read into" real property documents provisions deemed necessary in the interests of justice. This brings
us to the "term implied in law."
THE PROCESS OF IMPLICATION-TERMS IMPLIED IN LAW

The process of implication has been explained by one of the
great modern luminaries of the law. Speaking of the process of
implication in contract law, Lord Denning said:
17. 190 F.2d 817, 822 n.9 (5th Cir. 1951).
18. See, e.g., Comment, The Uniform Commercial Code as a Premisefor
Judicial Reasoning, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 880, 881 (1965), wherein it is observed: "In a significant and ever increasing number of situations ... statutory solutions deserve recognition by the courts-not because legislative
drafters have spoken directly to the issue in controversy, but because they
have spoken dispassionately and logically in an area troubled by analogous
problems and involving analogous considerations."
19. See, e.g., Adams v. Waddell, 543 P.2d 215 (Alaska 1975) (UCC standards used to determine lessee's rights regarding option to purchase leased
property); Seabrook v. Commuter Housing Co., 72 Misc. 2d 6, 12, 338
N.Y.S.2d 67, 71 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972) (landlord held to UCC merchant standard with respect to lease of an apartment).
20. See cases cited in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208, Reporter's Notes, comment c (1981).
21. Id. at § 208, comment g.
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This was a great advance in legal theory. Even though there was no
express term, nevertheless the law itself-which means the Court
itself-implied a term. It wrote into the contract a term which the
parties had not written: and upon which they had never agreed. It
did this so as to do what reason and justice required. This legal
theory can be traced back at least to Gardiner v. Gray (1815) 4
Camp. 133, when Gray showed Gardiner samples of some waste
silk and offered to sell him some. The bargain was made. A sale
note written: "12 bags of waste silk 10s 6d a lb." On delivery the 12
bags were found to be inferior to the samples and of poor quality.
Gardiner sued for damages. He sought to show an express warranty that the bags should be equal to the samples: he failed because it was not on the written sale note. In earlier times that
would have been the end of the case. But Gardiner also alleged an
implied warranty that the silk should be of good and merchantable
quality. On this, he succeeded. Lord Ellenborough said:
"Without any particular warranty, this is an implied term in
every such contract .... The purchaser cannot be supposed to
buy goods to lay them on a dunghill."
The important point in that case was that the warranty was imposed or imputed by law. It was imposed because it was just and
reasonable. Not because
the parties had agreed to it, either ex22
pressly or impliedly.
What Lord Denning called a term implied in law is what
Corbin chose to call a constructive condition. 23 Terminology is
not important, however. What is important is that the process of
implication has long been used as a means of achieving a just
and equitable result.
The doctrine of constructive conditions is recognized by today's authorities. 24 In so supplying a term that the parties failed
to include in the contract, the courts sometimes indicate that
this is done to require the parties to exercise "good faith and fair
dealing. '25 In short, fairness requires interpolation of the
term. 26 This is the Restatement's position.27 One may assume
that the word "supply" was used in the Restatement, instead of
the familiar "imply," in order to emphasize the notion that the
added language was strictly the contribution of the judge.
Like the doctrine of unconscionability, the doctrine of constructive conditions was invented in the interests of fairness and
justice. But there is a difference. The doctrine of unconscionability, as defined in the Restatement, is basically a negative
force employed to strike or limit unconscionable contracts or
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

LORD DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF THE LAW 34 (1979).
See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, at § 8.9, at 579 (1982).

Id. at §§ 7.16, 8.9.
Id. at § 7.17.
Id. at § 7.16, at 524.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 204, comment d (1981).
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contract terms. 28 But the two doctrines, used together, create a
push-pull effect. One is used to eliminate unfair provisions; the
other is used to insert provisions needed to make the contract
worthy of enforcement.
For the sake of completeness it seems appropriate to refer
briefly to some of Corbin's well-known views on the implication
of contract terms. He believes that the process is extremely
common. 29 It is a conscious process aimed at achieving a just
result.3 0 Moreover, the process is wholly independent of expressed intention and occurs where the parties had no ideas on
3
the subject. '
While Lord Denning talks of terms implied in law and
Corbin talks of constructive conditions, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts strikes out in a new direction. It appears to
discard the old terminology. Section 204 speaks of "supplying"
an omitted essential term.32 Comment d of that section states
that "the court should supply a term that comports with community standards of fairness and policy. . . ,,a3No name is furnished for this process. In section 226, Comment c, it is stated
that this process of "supplying" a term has often been "described as a 'constructive' (or 'implied in law') condition." But it
is further added that "in most such situations," the process will
fall under the obligation of "good faith and fair dealing" described in section 205.
Section 205, however, deals only with good faith and fair
dealing in performance and enforcement of the contract. 34 The
duty is not imposed during other stages of the contract. Bridging this gap in the Restatement approach is the doctrine of constructive conditions. To illustrate, the implied requirement of
marketable title in a contract for the sale of land would not arise
under the Restatement obligation of good faith and fair dealing
because it is a condition implied in the formation of the contract. In the interests of justice, it is a constructive condition
that the courts read into the terms of the contract.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at § 208, comment g.
3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 565 (1960).
Id.at § 561.
Id.at § 623. For a recent decision citing Corbin, see Onderdonk v.

Presbyterian Homes of New Jersey, 85 N.J. 171, 425 A.2d 1057 (1981) (holding

that contract between retirement community and its residents contained an
implied covenant that the former supply the latter with meaningful
financial statements).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1981).
33. Id.
34. Section 205 provides: "Every contract imposes upon each party a

duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."
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Somewhat similar problems exist with respect to the doctrines of frustration of purpose and impracticability of performance. Under these two doctrines, the court must determine
whether the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an event frustrates
or makes impracticable the continued enforcement of the contract. In the Introductory Note to Chapter 11 of the Restatement, it is stated that these doctrines are occasionally
subsumed under the phrase "'implied term' of the contract."
The Restatement, however, rejects this analysis in favor of that
of section 2-615 of the UCC. Under that section, the central inquiry is whether the occurrence of some circumstance was a
'35
"basic assumption on which the contract was made.
To many, all this will seem merely a change in terminology.
The judge trying a case in the real world is doing his best to
arrive at a just result. Since each case is unique in its factual
setting, the names the pundits attach to the doctrines they invent are of little importance. Most of the doctrines that have
been created in the effort to enable courts to do justice on the
unique facts of a case seem to puzzle the commentators dealing
with commercial law problems. A glance at the illustrations
given in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts reveals few real
property decisions. One is entitled to inquire whether the traditional home of real property litigation, the court of equity, has
found a simple, satisfactory way of dealing with the problem;
36
namely, by simply asking where the equities lie.
The sections of the Restatement referred to, and section 208,
the unconscionability section, are obviously part of the process
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Introductory Note to Chapter 11 (1981). The Reporter's Notes to the Introductory Note tell the reader
that the chapter basically deals with frustration of purpose and commercial
impracticability, concepts reasonably familiar to any real property lawyer.
However, the Restatement changes and modernizes these concepts. See E.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, at §§ 9.6-9.9. It is evident from Professor Farnsworth's analysis that the new contract law concerning frustration of purpose and commercial impracticability applies to real property transactions.
Some improvement over existing law is apparent. Thus Farnsworth ob-

serves: "The new synthesis candidly recognizes that the judicial function is
to determine whether, in the light of exceptional circumstances, justice requires a departure from the general rule that a promisor bears the risk of
increased difficulty of performance." Id. at § 9.6, at 678. This is something

any judge can understand. For a particularly illuminating but critical article on this topic, see Murray, Basis of the Bargain: Transcending Classical
Concepts, 66 MINN. L.

REV.

283 (1982).

36. See Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 Harv. L.
Rev. 741, 750-51 (1982); it is there noted: "Equity courts have long reviewed
contracts for fairness when equitable relief has been sought. Within recent
years the principle has emerged ...that law courts may to limit or deny
enforcement of a bargain promise when the bargain is 'unconscionable'."
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of doing what is perceived to be the fair and just thing.37 That
process is also practiced in the code-law countries of the European continent.3 8 It is the principle function of the court to ad39
minister justice between the parties before the court.
In a recent article, Professor Hillman deals with some of the
problems raised by the doctrine of unconscionability. 4° Near
the end of the article, he deals with the role of unconscionability
as developed in the courts of equity.41 He comments on Professor Left's conclusion that the importation of equitable uncon37. Those who fear the consequences of judicial tinkering with contracts are ignoring half the development of contract law, the equity half.
For four hundred years chancellors have been doing justice and in the process have not hesitated to alter contracts and contract remedies. Dawson,
Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1041, 1043
(1976), cited by Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability:
A New Frameworkfor UCC Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 29 (1981).
Is it possible to conceive of changes more drastic than the changes the
chancellors wrought in the common law mortgage when they invented the
equitable right of redemption? See R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, MODERN
MORTGAGE LAw AND PRACTICE § 1.3, at 30 (2d ed. 1981); Unconscionability,

supra note 11, at 28. Consider also equitable estoppel, reformation, marshalling of assets, equitable subordination; the whole range of equitable jurisprudence. Consider the equitable inroads upon the mortgage
acceleration clause that are commonplace today. KRATOVIL & WERNER,
supra, at §§ 14.01-14.73(b), at 201-12. If a contract must be tinkered with in
the interests of justice and fair play, that is exactly what the chancellors
have been doing all along. The UCC writers, in general, are accustomed to
the conservatism of the law courts dealing with sales of goods or actions for
contract damages. This, then, is a big part of the problem. The real property lawyers, accustomed as they are to operating in chancery, will feel
quite at home with the power of the court to deal with unconscionability.
They may not even understand the sufferings of the chattel transaction lawyers.
And, of course, the often absurd contortions of the common law judges
in an effort to do justice, covertly, without disturbing doctrine, have been
the subject of comment for many years. See, e.g., Siegelman v. Cunard
White Star, 221 F.2d 189, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1955) (Frank, J., dissenting) (courts
often nullify contract provisions by strained construction or other backdoor methods); DOBBS, REMEDIES 708 (1973); Llewellyn, Book Review, 52

HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939) ("Covert tools are never reliable tools."). Manipulation of either doctrine or facts should be avoided. Hillman, supra, at
16-17. The problem is one of a judicial grappling with all the facts and surrounding circumstances in a particular transaction, in order to dispense justice that avoids unconscionable results. Unconscionability, supra note 11,
at 37-38. Article 2 of the UCC is simply a manifestation of American legal
realism. Id. It is simply an addition to modern contract doctrines like frustration of purpose and commercial impracticability that reach for justice by
seeking to allocate risk according to the intentions of the parties. At all
events, the courts will not tolerate unconscionability today and will reform
the contract, where necessary, to achieve a conscionable result. Unconscionability, supra note 11, at 27.
38. R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAw 232-34 (3d ed. 1970).
39. Unconscionability,supra note 11, at 5.
40. Hillman, supra note 37.
41. Id. at 35.
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'
scionability into general contract law is not "sensible."
Hillman disagrees. Well, that issue is now settled. The UCC applies whether the litigation is at law or in equity simply because
it is the law of the land. And its contract philosophy applies to
land litigation, as the implied warranty cases involving buildersellers or landlords show. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts embodies this philosophy; it has become part of our equity law and land law.
Hillman also comments on Leff's views that equity is, in
practical effect, a stale concept, and that the UCC is not "primarily" designed for land transactions. 43 Again, Hillman disagrees
with Leff, and Hillman is right. You cannot have contract law for
chattel transactions that differs from the contract law applied to
land transactions. As for the staleness Leff perceived in the law,
is it conceivable that any real property lawyer could view as
stale the problems that arise today in mortgage law alone? The
acceleration problems? The due-on-sale problems? The specific
performance of takeout-loan commitments? The problem of
clogging the equity by participation by the lender in the profits
of a sale or by an option to buy the land? The equitable lien on
the proceeds of a construction loan? The diversion of proceeds
in subordination cases? The subrogation problem created by
the wrap-around mortgage?" It is precisely in today's complex
multi-million dollar real-estate transactions that guidance is
needed.
Hillman points out that UCC section 2-302 "provides a host
of clues that suggest the section was patterned after equitable
unconscionability." 45 This is a very valuable suggestion. Hillman's contribution is both insightful and courageous. He suggests that when required, the court may directly confront the
problem of the basic fairness of enforcing the terms of the agreement under pure unconscionability. 46 In support, he quotes
Professor Dawson, who said: "It seems to be forgotten that approximately half of our private law-the part that prevailed
when any conflict arose-was ascribed by the chancellors who
created it to standards no more precise than 'equity and good
conscience.' -147 And Professor Farnsworth speaks of equity as

42. Id. at 37.

43. Id. at 38.
44. See generally R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER,
§ 31.01 (2d ed. 1981).
45. Hillman, supra note 37, at 40 n.210.

MODERN MORTGAGE LAW

AND PRACTICE

46. Id. at 40.
47. Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 HARv.
L. REV. 1041, 1043 (1976).
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the "precursor of unconscionability. '48 Many rules of contract
law were derived from principles pronounced by the equity
courts. 49 As is evident, more attention must be devoted to the
problem of the equity judge confronted by a complex land transaction involving multiple parties and many millions of dollars.
CREATIVE JUDICIAL RECASTING OF REAL PROPERTY DOCUMENTS
PRIOR TO THE UCC-MARKETABLE TITLE

Creative judicial recasting of real property documents took
place long prior to the adoption of the UCC. Assume, for example, a bare-bones memorandum of sale of land devoid of any
mention of the quality of title. 50 The buyer is entitled to a marketable title free from encumbrances although the contract is
silent.5 1 It is idle to pretend that this requirement can be found,
by implication or otherwise, within the four corners of the instrument. The requirement is read into the contract ("supplied") by the court simply because the contract is unfair
without it. No one is dismayed by this. We have all become accustomed to it. And yet it certainly constitutes a very formidable recasting of the document.
This problem recurs so frequently in analysis that it is deserving of further attention. While at times it seems like a matter of semantics, it has occasioned much difficulty. There are
words in the English language that seem to exist only in the negative. One of these is the word "unconscionable." The word
"conscionable" is rarely encountered in American legal usage.
It does not appear in Black's Law Dictionary, Words and
Phrases, or Corpus Juris. While a judge can strike from a document a clause he deems unconscionable, such as a waiver of the
equitable right of redemption encountered in a mortgage, the
same judge will not introduce into a contract a provision he
deems conscionable, a clause needed to make the contract worthy of enforcement. Resort is compelled to different terminology, and a simple situation is rendered complex and difficult.
Let us suppose a simple contract for the sale of land that is
devoid of any mention of the quality of the title to be proffered to
the buyer. The court simply reads into the contract a requirement of "marketable title free from encumbrances." But the
48. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, at § 4.27.

49. Hillman, supra note 37, at 40.
50. See, e.g., Firebaugh v. Wittenberg, 309 Ill. 536, 141 N.E. 379 (1923)
(vendee entitled to marketable title although contract for sale was silent as

to quality of title).
51. 1 G. WARVELLE, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF VENDOR &
PURCHASER OF REAL PROPERTY 303 (1890).
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word "unconscionable" is thought to be inappropriate to characterize this process. We need to resort to phrases like "term implied in law," or "constructive condition," or "good faith," or
"term supplied by the court." This is unfortunate.
In any case, the document ought not to be enforced as written. Judicial intervention is needed to make the document just.
But agreement is lacking as to some comprehensive phrase to
characterize the judicial process by which a contract is revised
to make it worthy of enforcement. We are driven by nomenclature to conclude that two different judicial processes are at
work. This is not the case at all.
Another baneful influence which hampers understanding of
the realities involved is the tendency to repeatedly apply an accepted doctrine without a critical appraisal of its implications.
Thus, we can state the rule that the right of a purchaser to a
good title in a land sale contract does not grow out of the contract of the parties, but is "given by law and is implied in every
contract of sale. '52 But do we really understand the true import
of this rule? Courts habitually take a simple contract for the
sale of land that is wholly devoid of any mention of title, and
interpolate a provision needed in the interest of justice. The
courts then proceed to erect upon this base an enormous inverted pyramid of decisional law; the law of marketable title is
vast indeed. 3 But in the process, courts often forget that the
original purpose involved in recasting the contract was to
achieve justice. The decisions are mechanical. Few say anything about justice or fair dealing. It is high time that these notions be introduced into this body of law. One needs to be
reminded that justice is always the ultimate goal.
MORTGAGES-THE ACCELERATION CLAUSE

The law of unconscionability, of course, has its beginning in
the mortgage doctrine creating the equitable right of redemption, and the correlative doctrine forbidding waiver of that right.
The law of unconscionability in the field of mortgage law is also
52. C.

MAUPIN, MARKETABLE TITLE §

5 (2d ed. 1907). See also Annot., 57

A.L.R. 1253, 1269 (1928). This is not the simple process of supplying the
word "marketable" where the quality of title is not expressed. It is the process of introducing an entire complex body of law into the contract by implication in order to make the contract fair and just. And it is applicable
whether the litigation occurs at law or in chancery. Evidently, law courts
are quite competent to remake contracts in the interest of justice even

where the complexities are great.
53. See Annot., 57 A.L.R. 1253-1554 (1928).
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conspicuously present where questions of acceleration of the
54
mortgage debt are concerned.
This highly controversial problem has arisen in connection
with due-on-sale clauses permitting acceleration of the mortgage debt where the mortgaged land is sold without the written
consent of the mortgagee. The issues have been discussed by
55
the author.
In all the decisions it is conceded that the due-on-sale
clause is not invalid. Indeed, this concession holds for all the
acceleration clause decisions. The point, however, is that in
given circumstances courts will refuse to countenance acceleration if an unconscionable result would follow. Thus, we can extract another principle:
Despite the validity of a provision in a real property document, if it
is invoked in circumstances that will lead to an unconscionable result, courts will refuse to permit such a provision to be enforced.
As is evident, this principle will compel re-examination of all
older real property law decisions.
The above principle has been recognized for decades with
respect to other real property documents. Thus, in an installment contract for the sale of land, most courts recognize the validity of the forfeiture clause. But if the vendor habitually
accepts late payments, the provision that time is of the essence
is waived and the forfeiture will be held invalid if it is not pre54. See Delgado v. Strong, 360 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1978); Clark v.
Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. App. 1970); Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Eastern Ill. Water Co., 31 111. App. 3d 148, 334 N.E.2d 96, 102
(1975); Streets v. MGIC Mortgage Corp., 177 Ind. App. 184, 378 N.E.2d 915, 919
(1978); Miller v. Pacific First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 401, 545
P.2d 546, 547 (1976); Kratovil, Mortgage Law Today, 13 J. MAR. L. REV. 251
(1980). Much of this harks back to Justice Cardozo's famous dissent in Graf
v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 254 N.Y. 1, 171 N.E. 884, 886-89 (1930) (Cardozo, J., dissenting), where he remarked: "However fixed the general rule [of acceleration I and the policy of preserving it, there may be extraordinary conditions
in which the enforcement of such a clause according to the letter of the
covenant will be disloyalty to the basic principles for which equity exists."
Id. at 11, 171 N.E. at 887.
55. See Kratovil, A New Dilemma for Thrift Institutions: JudicialEmasculation of the Due-on-Sale Clause, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PRoc. 299 (1979).
Much of the discussion therein related to Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21
Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978). The California Supreme
Court there found it would "unjust" to permit acceleration solely for the
purpose of compelling payment of a higher interest rate. Id. at 953, 582 P.2d
at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
In Judge Cardozo's Graf dissent, he used the word "unconscionable"
several times. 254 N.Y. at 12, 171 N.E. at 887-88. In Wellenkamp, the court
relied heavily on an article discussing the due on sale clause, Note, Judicial
Treatment of the Due-on-Sale Clause: The Casefor Adopting Standardsof
Reasonableness and Unconscionability, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1109 (1975). The
unconscionability test is there treated in detail. Id. at 1126-27. The article
also discusses decisions where acceleration was held invalid because it resulted from unconscionable conduct of the lender. Id. at 1118.
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ceded by a timely warning reinstating that provision. 56 This is
simply another way of stating that, in these circumstances, forfeiture is unconscionable.
OPrIONS
57

Rego v. Decker involved a lease containing an option to
purchase which provided for payment of the option price over a
period of years. The tenant exercised the option. However, the
court found that if the option were taken literally it would have
taken more than fifty years to pay in full. On review, the Alaska
Supreme Court held that in a suit for specific performance, the
trial court should order reasonable terms of payment with adequate security, or direct the tenant to make a full cash payment
for the property.
As is evident, the Alaska Supreme Court went beyond the
approach taken by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
since it recast the terms of the contract to make them fair to
both parties. This should occasion no surprise. The UCC
opened the door for the Restatement. Both have opened the
door to a new approach in the decisional law, an activist approach that frankly recognizes the need to recast contracts
where to enforce them literally would create a harsh result.
Courts have always done this, though to a lesser degree and in
more subtle form, using phrases like implied promise, implied
condition, constructive condition, waiver, and the like. There is
no longer any need to hide the fact that courts are there to administer justice, not to parrot ancient dogma.
BROKERS

The traditional rule of brokers is that a commission is
earned when the broker finds a buyer ready, able, and willing to
buy on the seller's terms. 58 Whether or not the deal closes
thereafter has no impact on the broker's rights. However, a
strong dissenting voice has recently been heard. Ellsworth
Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson59 held that because the broker is much
56. Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 8, 13-14 (1953).

57. 482 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1971). The approach taken by the Alaska
Supreme Court in Rego is quite similar to that later taken by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120 N.J. Super. 357, 294
A.2d 253 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 1972).

58. See Bonanza Real Estate Inc. v. Crouch, 10 Wash. App. 380, 517 P.2d
1371 (1974).
59. 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967). See generally Note, Real PropertyBrokers-Buyer's Default on ContractFor Sale of Land Precludes Broker's

Right to Commission, 9 ARiz. L. REv. 519 (1968); Note, Brokerage Con-

tracts--ProspectivePurchaser'sBreach of Contract of Sale-Broker Not En-
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better informed as to the buyer's financial ability to consum60
mate a deal, the seller should not be liable for a commission if
the deal falls through because the buyer cannot command the
necessary financial resources. This sensible case conforms the
law to the common understanding of lay people. It can be regarded as introducing into the listing contract a term implied in
law that the seller's liability does not accrue until the buyer obtains his financing. The case has been followed in many jurisdictions and must be regarded as stating today's law on this
subject. Not surprisingly, Ellsworth Dobbs cites with approval a
61
decision by Lord Denning.
B & R OIL Co v. RAY'S MOBILE HOMES, INC.
It might prove helpful to apply these rules to current real
property problems. In a recent decision involving the validity of
an assignment of a lease, the Vermont Supreme Court followed
the "majority rule" and held that the landlord's consent could be
withheld unreasonably. 62 Under modern law, a lease is simply a
species of contract which happens to concern real estate. Principles of contract law are applicable. 63 The UCC, including the
64
unconscionability section, has been enacted in Vermont.
Since this statute, under the principles herein set forth, is a
binding precedent, it was applicable to the contract problem
under consideration in B & R Oil Co. Under the law of unconscionability, a conscionable provision of a contract will be inoperative if exercised in an unconscionable fashion. This simple
reasoning demonstrates that the case is clearly wrong. Probably
this aspect never appeared in the briefs, since real property lawyers are still trying to ignore the UCC. That is why we need
titled to Commission From Seller, 17 CATH. U.L. REV. 487 (1968); Recent
Cases, Real Estate Broker-Failureof Purchaserto Close Title as Defeating
Right to Compensation, 72 DICK. L. REV. 522 (1968), Note, Real PropertyBroker's Commissions-Defaultby Buyer, 19 MERCER L. REV. 460 (1968); Recent Cases, Real Estate-Broker's Commission-Time of Accrual, 30 OHIO
ST. L.J. 600 (1969); Note, Elsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson: A Reexamination of the Broker-Buyer-Seller Relationship in New Jersey, 23 RUTGERS L.
REV. 83 (1968); Note, Real Estate-Brokers--Vendor'sLiabilityfor Broker's
Commission Accrues on Date PurchaserCloses Title-DefaultingPurchaser
is Liable to Broker for Commission, 13 VuL. L. REV. 681 (1968); Recent
Cases, Agency-Right of Real Estate Broker to Commission From Seller, 10
WM. & MARY L. REV. 240 (1968).

60. 50 N.J. 528, 549, 236 A.2d 843, 853.
61. Id. (citing with approval Dennis Reed, Ltd. v. Goody, [1950] 2 K.B.
277, 284-85, [1950] 1 All E.R. 919, 923).
62. B &R Oil Co. v. Ray's Mobile Homes, Inc., 139 Vt. 122, 422 A.2d 1267
(1980).

63. Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120 NJ. Super. 357, 294 A.2d 253 (N.J.
Super Ct. Law Div. 1972).
64. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-302 (1966).
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some black-letter law to guide the courts. The Restatement
65
(Second) of Property agrees with this conclusion.
IMPACT ON REAL PROPERTY LEGAL RESEARCH

The effect of the views here expressed on real property legal
research is bound to be considerable. Even assuming that the
Restatement (Second) of Property is comprehensive and thoroughly researched, as will be the case, it must ultimately take a
definitive form. The legislatures will thereafter continue to legislate, as is obvious. Some of the legislation so enacted may fall
into precisely the same pattern that the Restatement considered
worthy of adoption as black letter law. Here, of course, is the
rub-legal researchers delving into the law of Illinois, let us say,
will have no choice but to research the statutory law of the other
forty-nine states seeking a pattern that gives rise to black letter
law. No doubt, commercial services will arise to fill the need.
But a new element of uncertainty will be injected into the research process. This, on the whole, should be welcomed in the
profession. Legal research, after all, is the province of scholars.
Moreover, good legal research is a highly creative process. The
catalogue of constructive conditions, for example, is never complete. If you are going to ask a reviewing court to add a new
constructive condition to the list, you must have a good grasp of
the process by means of which such conditions are created.
This is a task for scholars.
CONCLUSIONS

It may occur to some readers that much of what has been
said here has been said previously. This, to be sure, cannot be
denied. But it will be found that each such statement occurs in
isolation. It is only when these statements are strung together,
so to speak, that a new philosophy of real property law is
revealed.
What is important is that we recognize a need to take stock,
to draw a line, and to acknowledge that real property problems
must now be analyzed in view of the great strides that may have
recently taken place. The old, black letter law is no longer an
ironclad guide to the achievement of justice in a given legal con65.

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF PROPERTY,

LANDLORD

AND

TENANT

§ 15.2(2) (1977) provides:
A restraint on alienation without the consent of the landlord of the tenant's interest in the leased property is valid, but the landlord's consent
to an alienation by the tenant cannot be withheld unreasonably, unless
a freely negotiated provision in the lease gives the landlord an absolute
right to withhold consent.
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troversy. The old landmarks and precedents must be continually subjected to scrutiny. Stare decisis, if not dead, has been
dealt some mortal blows.

